Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa by Dietrich, Simone & Wright, Joseph
Foreign Aid Allocation Tactics and Democratic Change in Africa
Simone Dietrich∗
Joseph Wright†
May 2014
Abstract
Over the past two decades, donors increasingly link foreign aid to democracy objectives in
Africa. This study investigates whether and how foreign aid influences specific outcomes asso-
ciated with democratic transition and consolidation. Using an instrumental variables approach
for the period from 1989 to 2008, we show that economic aid increases the likelihood of transi-
tion to multiparty politics, while democracy aid furthers democratic consolidation by reducing
the incidence of multiparty failure and electoral misconduct. However, we find little evidence
that either economic or democracy aid influences opposition support in multiparty elections.
These findings have implications for understanding how donors allocate aid and the political
consequences of foreign assistance in Africa.
∗University of Missouri, corresponding author. Replication materials can be found at:
www.simone-dietrich.com.
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Since the end of the Cold War, a consensus in the international donor community argues that
democracy is an integral part of development efforts. Some foreign aid proponents suggest that
without aid “the global democratic revolution cannot be sustained” Diamond (1992, 45). While a
normative approach to democracy promotion emphasizes the importance of civil and political rights
for human freedom (Sen, 1999), the instrumental perspective promotes democratization based on
the premise that democratic institutions incentivize governments to increase spending on welfare
outcomes (Stasavage, 2005; Huber, Mustillo and Stevens, 2008; Harding and Stasavage, 2014). In
the 1990s and 2000s, donors contributed hundreds of billions of dollars of aid worldwide, with the
largest proportion flowing to sub-Saharan Africa. Goldsmith (2001) and Dunning (2004) show that
foreign aid positively influences democracy in recipient countries, yet neither study explores the
causal mechanisms linking aid and democratic change.1 Our contribution examines possible causal
mechanisms by looking at the same region: Africa.
Sub-Saharan African cases are useful for testing arguments linking aid to democracy because
in the past two decades most countries in the region adopted multiparty politics. This not only
marked a shift in power in many countries but also provides much of the evidence for the global
wave of democratic transitions since the end of the Cold War. From 1989 to 2008, roughly half
of all democratic transitions in the world occurred in sub-Saharan Africa; and countries with a
variety of autocratic regimes – including personalist rule, military dictatorships, and one-party
states – experienced transitions.2 However, the shift to multiparty politics did not lead to a wave
of consolidated democracies (Posner and Young, 2007; Cheeseman, 2011). Indeed, in the twenty
years to 2008 incumbent leaders left power only eight times after losing elections under established
multiparty regimes.3 Thus for many countries in the region, the introduction of multiparty politics
1Other research suggests that aid has pernicious effects on democratic development (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2008; Brautigam and Knack, 2004).
2Data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) show that 24 of 47 transitions to democracy
took place in sub-Saharan Africa.
3These are: Benin 2001, Cape Verde 2001, Ghana 2000, Guinea-Bissau 2000, Kenya 2002,
Madagascar 1996, Mali 2002, and Senegal 2000.
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did not lead to strong democratic institutions. This variation in post-transition democracies spurred
a vibrant debate about the determinants of democratic survival and consolidation. This paper
examines how external assistance influences transition to and consolidation of democracy, and in
doing so employs multiple measures to capture distinct aspects of consolidation.
We examine two mechanisms through which aid might influence democracy in recipient coun-
tries: (1) donors attaching political reform conditions to economic aid; and (2) donors directly
investing in democracy promotion through activities aimed at strengthening governance institu-
tions and civil society. These mechanisms focus on different categories of aid – economic aid and
democracy assistance – and have implications for distinct political outcomes. For example, donor
pressure to hold elections may be more likely to push a transition to multiparty regimes but may
not influence electoral support for the opposition or electoral misconduct. Investing in civil society
organizations, in contrast, is unlikely to operate through economic aid but has implications for
whether democracy assistance improves electoral support for opposition parties.
To date, however, most research on foreign aid and political development tests how aid influences
broad indices of democracy from sources such as the Polity index or Freedom House. While useful for
many purposes, these measures are unable to distinguish particular aspects of democratic transition
and consolidation. Further, only a handful of studies look at how the political effect of economic
and democracy aid may differ. In this paper, we unpack the hypothesized mechanisms linking aid to
democracy by examining multiple dimensions of democratic political change – including transitions
to and from multipartyism as well as electoral misconduct and electoral support for the opposition
– and test how different broad categories of aid influence these outcomes.
We show that donors pursue a strategy of incumbent-led democracy promotion in Africa when
dealing with dictators and democrats. While donors use aid to propel top-down democratic re-
forms both prior to and after transitions to multiparty regimes, they do so by pursuing different
tactics. When dealing with dictators, donors employ economic development assistance to buy
political reform that is largely procedural in nature, such as legalizing opposition parties and hold-
ing multiparty elections. While these reforms are sufficient for “formal” transitions to multiparty
regimes, they may not necessarily alter the balance of power between the incumbent and opposi-
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tion groups. Nor do such reforms necessarily require elites to change their political practices. This
makes transitions relatively cheap for many dictators.
Donors dealing with democrats in post-transition contexts influence democratic development
through targeted investment in democracy-related activities rather than via conditionality attached
to economic aid. Further, we show that donors are most successful at influencing democratic
consolidation outcomes by investing in governance but find little evidence that democracy aid
targeting civil society organizations influences election outcomes or incumbent electoral behavior.
Our findings have implications for democracy promotion and international actors who attempt
to influence the process of democratic transition and consolidation. By shedding light on the
causal pathways through which foreign aid changes political outcomes in recipient countries, we
show both the areas where foreign actors can promote democratic outcomes and the limits of
such strategies. We find that while economic aid can buy relatively cheap multiparty transitions,
democracy aid can help consolidate multiparty regimes but rarely influences the political balance
between incumbents and the opposition in these countries. Our findings illustrate the value of
differentiating aid categories and precisely measuring the political outcomes that most closely match
the causal story. An emerging literature links foreign aid to many important outcomes such as
civil conflict, terrorism, and human rights (Nielsen et al., 2011; Savun and Tirone, 2012). Future
research in these areas will benefit from examining different categories of foreign aid to pinpoint
the mechanisms at work.
Foreign aid and democracy
Studies linking aid to democracy provide a mixed picture. Some argue that donors leverage their
economic power by attaching political reform conditions to aid packages. Using conditionality to
‘buy reform’ requires that donors can credibly withdraw or redirect aid when recipient government
do not comply (Burnell, 1997; Dunning, 2004). This mechanism is often associated with transitions
to multiparty politics, particularly in the 1990s. For example, Resnick (2013) highlights the crucial
role of donor leverage in Malawi’s first multiparty election in 1993; and Handley (2008) argues
that donor pressure motivated Ghana’s President, Jerry Rawlings, to “consider liberalization of
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the political regime and a return to constitutionalism.” Citing this leverage mechanism, some find
a link between aid and democratic transitions only during the post-Cold War period when donors’
threat of aid withdrawal was most credible (Dunning, 2004; Wright, 2009; Bermeo, 2011).
Others posit that democracy assistance influences democracy through a direct investment chan-
nel, targeting either incumbent governments (by focusing on budgeting procedures, bureaucratic
competence, and judicial and legislative independence) or democratizing agents in civil society
(by focusing on particular organizations that typically stand outside the recipient government).
Citing the investment mechanism, some studies find that democracy assistance increases the level
of democracy, as measured by broad democracy indicators (Finkel, Pe´rez-Lia´n and Seligson, 2007;
Scott and Steele, 2011). Bush (Forthcoming) explores the nature of civil society assistance and finds
that, over time, democracy promotion has become more “tame” as international NGOs increasingly
select more regime-compatible projects to guarantee future funding.
We contribute to this debate by presenting an argument that differentiates between mecha-
nisms of democracy promotion (economic and democracy aid) and distinct delivery channels of
democracy assistance (donor-to-government and donor-to-civil society). We specify when aid con-
tributes to democratic outcomes and in doing so explain why donors successfully promote horizontal
accountability but have fallen short in improving vertical accountability.
Donor tactics and democracy promotion
Transitions to multiparty politics and democratic consolidation represent different stages of demo-
cratic development, which trigger different donor tactics. Multiparty transitions require incumbents
to focus on a targeted event – elections with opposition parties – while consolidation requires more
complex political changes. In the 1990s, donor demands for elections and minimal procedural re-
forms converged around election day. For example, Brown (2011) provides evidence from interviews
with donors working in countries as diverse as Rwanda, Kenya, and Malawi that aid recipients heard
a consistent reform message emphasizing multiparty elections; while Crawford (2001) notes that
donor coordination was crucial for leveraging multiparty elections across the continent.
After transitions, however, there is less donor consensus on the specific goals of democracy pro-
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motion. Not all donors agree on how to advance democratic consolidation, especially when donors
face trade-offs among consolidation, development, and stability in recipient countries (Brown, 2011).
While the pursuit of each of these policy goals may be desirable, they are not always compatible.
Since the mid-1990s donor governments have emphasized improving service delivery and develop-
ment, as is evident in the Millennium Development Goals. Donors fear that withholding foreign
aid in response to lackluster progress in democratic consolidation may lead to far worse outcomes,
such as instability and conflict (Resnick, 2013). What is more, key principles of the international
aid architecture, such as country-ownership, create donor ambivalence about criticizing recipients’
commitment to democratic consolidation.
In light of these tensions, donors should be less forceful in promoting democratic consolidation
efforts than transitions to multipartyism. Instead of relying on threats to withdraw economic
assistance, as was often the case prior to multiparty transitions, donors increasingly pursue more
targeted tactics by earmarking aid for specific democracy promotion activities. The top panel of
Figure 1 shows that while economic aid to sub-Saharan African countries dipped in the 1990s,
democracy aid increased throughout the past two decades with largest bump after 1998.
Further, once countries transitioned to multiparty regimes, donors substantially increased democ-
racy aid – both to the government and to civil society groups – with no corresponding economic
aid dividend. The bottom, left panel of Figure 1b shows that democracy aid increased by nearly
20 percent in the three years after a multiparty transition relative to the pre-transition period.
The bottom, right panel shows that the collapse of multiparty regimes also yields large increases
in democracy assistance. Economic aid, on the other hand, remains at very similar levels pre- and
post-transition, but drops considerably once a multiparty regime collapses.
When dealing with dictators prior to multiparty transitions, donors prioritize economic de-
velopment assistance as a tool to extract political reform concessions. The political conditions
attached to economic aid are often relatively minimal in scope and procedural in nature, consisting
of items such as introducing executive term limits, legalizing opposition parties, and holding elec-
tions. While such reforms are often sufficient for “formal” transitions to democracy, they may not
necessarily alter the political balance in the country in significant ways or require elites to change
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their political practices. For instance, Tanzania’s shift to a multipartyism in the 1990s represented
a formal break from the past. Yet, the incumbent Chama Chama Mapinduzi (CCM) managed the
transition and post-transition environments to its advantage, resulting in uninterrupted dominance
over opposition parties (Tripp, 2012). During the transition to democracy in Ghana, the ruling
National Democratic Congress (NDC) stacked transition bodies with pro-NDC members and kept
the election timetable “closely guarded,” while the opposition dismissed the introduction of multi-
party politics as “transitions without change” (Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, 2013, 1-2). In both cases,
donors primarily focused their demands on holding of elections. Even though the advent of multi-
partyism may not substantially alter politics in aid recipient countries, as these case illustrations
suggest, there is nonetheless a clear empirical expectation that follows from the leverage argument:
economic aid should increase the likelihood of multiparty transitions in recipient countries.
Once countries transition to multiparty regimes, democracy promotion initiatives aim to con-
solidate democratic rule by strengthening both horizontal and vertical accountability. Donor in-
vestments in judicial independence, legislative effectiveness, and anti-corruption commissions, for
example, may check abuses by government officials, while donor aid targeting civil society groups
and political party development may improve vertical accountability. In a post-transition context,
donors are more apt to focus on influencing democracy through targeted investment in horizon-
tal accountability. These investments emphasize strengthening state capacity, which is direclty
compatible with economic development goals.
Further, whereas the leverage argument focuses on the relationship between donors and recip-
ient governments, investments in democracy aid target two types of actors in recipient countries:
the incumbent government and civil society groups, with the latter sometimes including opposition
political parties. The strategies donors choose in attempts to influence recipient country politics
have implications for how and to whom donors deliver aid. For example, Dietrich shows that donors
increasingly bypass the government and give aid directly to non-state actors in poorly governed
countries to prevent the capture of aid through corrupt officials or inefficient state institutions Di-
etrich (2013, 2014). Further, by strategically targeting sectors where recipient compliance with aid
project goals is relatively easy, donors can provide recipient governments with a stronger incentive
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to comply and thereby improve aid effectiveness Dietrich (2011).
Who receives democracy aid, in turn, has implications for its political consequences. Democracy
aid projects aimed at increasing state capacity target recipient governments and may therefore
increase incumbent strength. For example, an aid project such as Canada’s $17 million investment
in Mali’s Justice Development Project in 2010 attempts to strengthen the credibility, effectiveness
and accessibility of the national justice system to citizens. The recipient government – in this
case the Ministry of Justice – was the direct recipient of democracy aid and implemented the
program. Democracy aid that targets recipient governments may strengthen the incumbent regime
by improving state capacity in predictable ways and thus increasing the regime’s legitimacy vis-a-vis
citizens. A case study of donor involvement in Mali by Van de Walle (2013) highlights this point and
goes even further by suggesting that the focus of aid resources on the central governments provided
a clear incumbency advantage vis-a-vis civil society and political parties. Evidence from Malawi
(Resnick, 2013) and Zambia (Rakner, 2013) suggests a similar dynamic where donors contributed to
improving electoral management and electoral fairness but executive dominance remained largely
unchallenged. Recipient governments therefore have an incentive to implement democracy aid
projects, but only when donor goals such as improving state capacity or service delivery do not
threaten the ability of the incumbent to retain power.
In contrast, aid efforts that directly target civil society and opposition forces largely bypass
the incumbent regime.4 These projects should strengthen opposition groups and thus weaken in-
cumbent leaders. For instance, Denmark’s $4 million support for grass-roots mobilization efforts
in Karamoja, Uganda, bypassed the incumbent government entirely and instead was implemented
by a local non-governmental organization, Uganda Action for Social Change. By providing organi-
zational and material resources to opposition groups, this bottom-up democracy aid can help level
the playing field between incumbents and the opposition. Case study evidence from Benin (Gazibo,
2013) and Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, 2013) show that donor funding of civil society and
opposition groups can significantly bolstered non-state actors’ capacity to increase voter-turn out
thus directly affecting the electoral playing field in a series of successive, competitive elections. In
4In some contexts, however, incumbent governments may infiltrate NGOs.
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these types of democracy promotion projects, donors select either the government or groups outside
the government as primary recipients of aid. This selection, in turn, has implications for both the
causal mechanism linking aid to democratic consolidation outcomes and the direction of the ex-
pected relationship: democracy aid to the government strengthens the incumbent while democracy
aid to civil society weakens incumbent power.
Further, some outcomes associated with democratic consolidation, such as the duration of mul-
tiparty regimes, do not necessarily threaten the incumbent’s hold on power, as the Tanzanian
case illustrates. In contrast, other outcomes, such as stronger electoral support for the opposi-
tion, directly threaten government survival. Standard measures of democracy derived from the
Polity or Freedom House, however, cannot distinguish between these. We therefore use measures of
democratic consolidation that may entail both threats to incumbents and those that do not. This
discussion suggests three expectations:
• Transition hypothesis: Economic aid increases the likelihood of multiparty transition
• Consolidation hypothesis (a): Democracy aid to recipient governments furthers demo-
cratic consolidation that does not threaten incumbents
• Consolidation hypothesis (b): Democracy aid to civil society furthers democratic consol-
idation that may threaten incumbents.
Research Design
Democratic transition and consolidation
We define multipartyism as the existence of an opposition party in an elected legislature. Minimally,
this entails universal suffrage,5 an elected legislature, legal opposition parties, and at least one party
outside the regime front with seats in the legislature. This definition of multipartyism excludes
regimes that allowed opposition parties but never held an election to place them in a legislature
(e.g. the former Zaire from 1992-1997). It also says nothing about electoral fairness or civil liberties,
5The suffrage rule allows the start of multiparty politics in South Africa (1994) and Zimbabwe
(1980) after the end of restricted suffrage rule.
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and thus groups together countries with relatively non-violent and free elections (e.g. Botswana
1999 and 2004) with countries which sometimes have unfair and violent multiparty elections (e.g.
Kenya 1997 and 2007).
While multipartyism may be a minimal condition for democracy (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vree-
land, 2010), two features of multiparty transitions are relevant for assessing the influence of foreign
aid. First, donors can relatively cheaply and objectively identify whether multiple parties compete
for and hold positions in an elected legislative body. Second, the introduction of multipartyism
need not pose a direct threat to the incumbent regime. We examine how democracy assistance and
economic aid influence the advent of 49 multiparty transitions between 1989 and 2008.
Our second measure is the breakdown of a multiparty system. After a country has transitioned
to a multiparty regime, it then becomes at risk of reversal. We define multipartyism failure as any
one of the following occurring: (a) government change via a coup or replacement of a leader/party
during a civil conflict;6 (b) institutional change that excludes the opposition, such that opposition
parties are illegal or no party outside the regime front is seated in the legislature; or (c) opposition
withdraw so that there is no party outside the regime front seated in the legislature.
The March 2003 coup in the Central African Republic, in which the former Army Chief of Staff
– Franc¸ois Bozize´ – ousted Fe´lix Patasse´, is an example of (a). After the coup, Bozize´ suspended
the constitution and abolished the legislature. Charles Taylor’s government in Liberia banned all
opposition parties in April 2002, marking the end of multipartyism (b). He had won the prior
election (1997) by a large margin while the opposition UP (Johnson-Sirleaf’s party) secured only
seven seats, marking the start of multipartyism. The next scheduled election (2003) never took
place. Finally, all the main opposition parties in Comoros, including the Movement for Democratic
Progress (MDP-NGDC) and the former authoritarian party UDZIMA, boycotted the December
1996 legislative elections. The only other party to win legislative seats was allied with the ruling
National Rally for Development. This election boycott ended multipartyism (c).7
6Assassination of a leader does not end multipartyism unless this results in an opposition exec-
utive taking power or the closing of the legislature.
7Table A1 lists the multiparty sample; Table A2 lists the multiparty transition and failure events.
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While transitions to and from multipartyism are central to understanding democratic consol-
idation, neither capture an essential feature of democratic politics: incumbent leaders or parties
losing power in elections. Even though the introduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s entailed
dislodging many longtime rulers, newly elected leaders only rarely lost at the ballot box, with only
eights such instances in the two decades from 1989-2008. With so few data points, it is difficult to
directly test how aid influences the prospects of incumbent turnover during this period.
To capture other aspects of democratic consolidation, we use measures of electoral miscon-
duct and opposition vote-share. Electoral misconduct gauges observed incumbent behavior during
election years, using an indicator constructed from variables in the NELDA data set: opposition
harassment, preventing opposition parties from participating, and violence during elections periods
(Hyde and Marinov, 2012). We treat unclear cases as ‘no evidence’ of misconduct. This codes 30
percent of election years with violence; incumbents prevented opposition participation in 12 per-
cent; and incumbents harassed the opposition in 29 percent.8 The dependent variable is coded 1 if
any of these types of misconduct occur during an election year; and 0 otherwise. We examine 170
multiparty election years from 1989 to 2008 in 40 countries; 47 percent are coded as misconduct.
While we do not directly test how aid influences electoral turnover under multipartyism, this
outcome requires that opposition parties become more competitive in elections vis-a-vis the in-
cumbent. We therefore examine electoral support for opposition parties. If democracy assistance
provides resources for democratizing agents to mobilize support for political parties and increase
voter-turnout,9 then we should find evidence linking this category of aid to electoral support for
opposition candidates and parties. One criticism foreign leaders level at donors – particularly U.S.
democracy assistance programs – points to the possibility that democracy aid hurts incumbents by
mobilizing political opponents. In Russia and Venezuela, for example, incumbent leaders accused
donors of directly funding opposition parties (Cole, 2007; Herszenhorn and Barry, 2012). Alterna-
tively, aid critics often argue that economic aid helps rulers remain in power by providing non-tax
revenues with which they can buy acquiescence if not outright support. This latter argument
8Some election years were marred by more than one type of misconduct.
9NGOs may aid protesters when electoral institutions perform poorly (Boulding, 2010).
10
implies that aid should bolster electoral support for incumbents.
We measure opposition electoral support as the percentage vote for the largest opposition party
(or candidate) as a share of the two-party vote: OO+I , where O is the vote share for the largest
opposition party and I is the vote share for the incumbent. This operationalization circumvents
issues related to electoral rules and the fragmentation of party systems by focusing on a continuous
measure of how close the largest opposition party is to defeating the incumbent at the polls. We
concentrate on first round executive elections after a transition to multiparty politics because these
contests pit the incumbent party against opposition candidates.10
Foreign Aid
We use foreign aid commitment data from AidData 2.0. We aggregate aid commitments at the recip-
ient country year level and distinguish between economic aid and democracy aid sectors. Economic
aid subsumes several sectors, including social, democracy, economic infrastructure and services,
domestic production, environment, commodity aid, debt relief, budget support, and emergency
relief. Democracy assistance has different purposes and distinct delivery modalities. For instance,
democracy and governance aid (DGA) includes projects that directly target policy planning in ar-
eas such as fiscal and monetary policy, institutional capacity building, and structural reform. DGA
also finances tax assessment procedures, legal and judicial development, and constitutional devel-
opment. Donors use DGA to support government administration by helping finance civil service
reform and government infrastructure. In addition to financing governance-related activities, DGA
also flows to non-state development actors including civil society groups and political parties to
10We examine 84 elections in 34 countries (listed in Appendix Table A4), a smaller number than
in last section because the former included legislative elections and first multiparty elections. When
there are no direct elections for President, we include parliamentary elections. We exclude: elections
where the second round was never held (e.g. Angola 1992); where the results were annulled (e.g.
Nigeria 1993); and where no incumbent contests (e.g. Liberia 2005). Appendix Table B4 shows
that results are similar if we employ the total opposition vote share (instead of largest opposition
vote as share of two-party vote) as the dependent variable.
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support community participation, strengthen political accountability, and development.11
The top panel of Figure 1 shows that OECD economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa declined in
the 1990s but increased in the 2000s, returning to levels that outpaced aid flows at the end of the
Cold War. While donors give aid for a variety of reasons, the distribution of aid across different
sectors reflects the relative priority donors attach to them. In the past two decades, donors have
substantially increased aid earmarked for democracy promotion; and by 2008 we observe a five-fold
increase in democracy assistance to Africa. The left panel of Figure 2 shows that the majority
of DGA to Africa is direct investment in strengthening state institutions: while DGA rises from
3 percent of total aid in 1990 to over 10 percent in 2008, only a small fraction of democracy
promotion activities targets civil society groups. Further, the right panel of Figure 2 shows that
the U.S. share of total DGA – which is the focus of studies such as Finkel, Pe´rez-Lia´n and Seligson
(2007) and Scott and Steele (2011) – remains only a small part of democracy assistance from all
donors, particularly after 2000.
We leverage this disaggregated project-level information on aid delivery channels to buttress
the micro-foundations of our argument: donors pursue different goals of democracy promotion by
relying on government-led delivery mechanisms. We measure aid as the logged value of the lagged
three-year moving average of aid per capita.12 The time series for smaller categories of aid, such
as democracy and governance aid, show large variation from year to year, so a moving average
smooths these trends to better capture inflows over the prior period.
Empirical Approach
We test the influence of aid at two stages of democratic development: transition and consolidation.
The first examines transitions to multiparty regimes; the sample contains 49 transitions in 44 sub-
Saharan African countries. The second examines how aid influences the persistence of multiparty
regimes in 44 countries, 16 of which fail. Subsequently we also examine the effect of aid on two
11The data groups all non-state actors,including NGOs and political parties, in the same category.
Table A5 lists the distinct purposes for democracy and governance aid as coded by AidData (2010).
12Aid is: ln((At−1 +At−2 +At−3)/3) where A is constant dollar aid commitments per capita.
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additional measures of consolidation: electoral misconduct and opposition vote-share. For the
analysis of transitions to and the persistence of multiparty regimes, we adopt a survival approach
that accounts for time dependence in the data and include a cubic polynomial of regime duration
(Carter and Signorino, 2010).13 The control variables are: GDP per capita (log), population (log),
and an indicator variable for civil war in the past two years.14 While GDP per capita and population
are standard controls in models of aid and political outcomes, civil war in recipient countries can
cause donors to reduce aid, particularly democracy assistance, and aid often increases substantially
after civil wars end. Further, conflict may directly cause political leaders to lose power because
many multiparty failure events occur when rebels oust the incumbent.
To address the possibility that donors give more aid to recipient countries they expect to be
more democratic, we first examine “placebo” tests to examine whether there is evidence of a reverse
causal pathway, from political change to aid disbursement. The bottom left panel of Figure 1b
shows that on average OECD donors reward multiparty transitions with more democracy aid but
not with more economic aid. This suggests that a naive estimate of the influence of democracy aid
on transitions may be biased upwards but this would not necessarily be the case for economic aid.
The bottom right panel shows that donors both cut economic assistance and increase democracy
aid after a multiparty failure event. These tests suggest the possibility that, even though we use
a 3-year lagged moving average for aid, naive estimates may be upwardly biased estimates from
reverse causation, particularly for democracy aid.
Addressing endogeneity through exogenous and model-based instruments Our identi-
fication strategy is three-fold. First, we employ instruments that exploit information from donor
13The duration variables are correlated with the number of prior elections; thus we account for
the possibility that repeated holding of elections promotes democratic norms (Lindberg, 2006).
14Economic and population data are from the Penn World Tables (version 7.0) and data for
civil war is from Gleditsch 2002. In the Appendix, we examine the robustness of these results
with additional control variables, such as economic growth, participation in an IMF adjustment
program, oil rents, and ethnic fractionalization.
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countries to capture the exogenous flows of aid to recipient countries. Second, we probe the ex-
clusion restriction by (a) testing for alternative channels through which aid may affect democratic
change in aid-receiving and (b) relaxing the exogeneity assumption to assess how doing so influ-
ences the estimates of interest. Third, we employ “internal” model-based instruments to identify
the endogenous regressor through first-stage heteroskedasticity following Lewbel (2012).
We construct the exogenous instrument by leveraging information on two donor country char-
acteristics – domestic inflation and the share of women in parliament – which correlate with aid
flows but are unlikely to directly influence political outcomes in recipient countries. For example,
inflation is associated with higher government spending, which also influences aid spending; and
women in parliament is likely to be correlated with aid because as women increase their representa-
tion, aid policy often becomes more oriented toward social equality. Recent studies find that female
legislators are more likely to support non-military aid as well as social equity in foreign economic
policy (Breuning, 2001). These theoretical considerations do not offer clear-cut expectations about
how these factors relate to different types of aid, so we select instruments based on how strongly
they correlate with different types of aid to identify the most parsimonious model.
While it is impossible to establish statistical exogeneity, we begin by assuming that these factors
shape budgetary decisions in donor countries, including the allocation of aid, but do not directly
influence political change in recipient countries. Next, we probe the exclusion restriction by testing
the association between the excluded instruments and alternative channels of influence; as well as
by relaxing this exclusion restriction and treating the instruments as “plausibly exogenous.”
Data on donor inflation (Inflation) is from the WDI (2010) and data on female legislators
(or women in parliament, WiP) is from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2012). To construct the
excluded instruments, we weight the donor characteristic Z (either Inflation or WiP) by the distance
between donor and recipient country.15 We then sum across all donors for each recipient in each
year. Because donors vary by recipient and donor characteristics change over time, the excluded
instruments vary across both time and recipient country.
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. Appendix C lists details about how the
instruments were constructed.
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Probing the exclusion restriction An additional concern arises because the factors we identify
as statistically related to aid (Z) but causally unrelated to political change in recipient countries may
still be correlated with alternative channels that influence the outcome variables. The existence
of such variables mean the exclusion restriction may be violated. Our approach to probing the
exclusion restriction has two components.
We first show that the excluded instruments are generally uncorrelated with alternative channels
through which they might influence the outcome variables. Figure C-3 in the Appendix provides
the partial correlation plots for each of the excluded outside instruments, Inflation and WiP, and
an array of potential confounders that represent different areas of foreign policy: trade; member-
ship in international government organizations; partnerships with international non-governmental
organizations abroad; the stock of recipient-country migrants in donor countries; and security al-
liances between donor and recipient countries.16 If the outside instruments are correlated with these
factors, which might be causally related to the outcome variable, then the exclusion assumption
is weaker. The partial correlation plots demonstrate that, with the exception of membership in
international organizations (WiP) and migrant stock (Inflation), there is little empirical connection
between the outside instruments and these alternative channels. Appendix B also shows that the
reported results are robust to including these variables as controls.
We then relax the exogeneity assumption to assess how doing so influences the estimate of
interest. In the spirit of treating the outside instruments as “plausibly exogenous”, we show that
even if these variables (Z) are weakly related to the outcome, inference from the reported tests is still
valid. We employ a conservative approach, which Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) call the “unified
confidence interval”, that allows Z to be correlated (to some extent) with the errors in the outcome
equation. As the assumed partial correlation between Z and the outcome varies, the estimate
for Economic aid is still valid for the widest plausible range of this correlation. The estimate
for Democracy aid is valid for a smaller range of this correlation, implying that the exogeneity
assumption about the outside instrument (WiP) must be stronger for valid inference.17
16Appendix C lists details about the data sources of the alternative channel measures.
17Appendix C includes a detailed description of our “plausibly exogenous” approach. Figure C3
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Because it is difficult to find appropriate instruments that satisfy the exclusion restriction,
we complement the “outside” instruments with information from “internal” instruments using an
approach that exploits the fact that covariance between the “first-stage” errors and the exogenous
variables (X) is not necessarily zero but rather heteroskedastic Lewbel (2012, 67).18 Consider the
following two-equation model:
Y1 = β1X + γ1Aid+ 1
Aid = β2X + γ2Z + 2
The main outcome variable of interest (Y1) is a function of covariates (X) and Aid, which is
endogenous (mismeasured). If Z is correlated with aid but unrelated to Y1, then Z may be
used as an “outside” excluded instrument to generate predicted values of Aid. If, however, the
cov(X, 22) 6= 0, the “first stage” residuals can be exploited as an “inside” excluded instrument. Be-
cause the heteroskedasticity arises from the “first stage”, this does not threaten inference about Y1.
The construction of an “internal” excluded instrument is the following: (1) calculate the residual
from a “first-stage” regression (i,t); (2) calculate the in-sample deviation from the mean for each
independent variable in the first stage regression (Xi,t, − µX); and finally (3) multiply the two:
I = i,t× (Xi,t,−µX). We choose Z based on maximizing the “first-stage” explanatory power; and
employ I for each of the variables in X (GDP pc, Population, and duration polynomials)
What is more, by employing “Lewbel” instruments, which are constructed to be orthogonal to
the outcome error process, we can use standard diagnostic tests to assess the extent to which the
excluded “outside” instruments (Z) are orthogonal to the outcome errors. For each specification, we
report the p-value of the C-statistic, which under the null indicates whether the suspect instruments
are valid. Thus p-values larger than conventional cut-points (e.g. 0.10) indicate the exclusion
restriction is satisfied. We find no evidence that, conditional on the assumption that the Lewbel
reports the relevant coefficient estimates.
18See Appendix C for discussion of this method in our application; and Finkel, Pe´rez-Lia´n and
Seligson (2007) for a similar application in the aid literature. Appendix Table C1 reports Breusch-
Pagan tests for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the first-stage equations.
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instruments are valid, the outside instruments are correlated with the outcome errors.
Results
Table 1 reports tests for transitions to multiparty rule. The first three columns examine economic
aid. Column 1 reports the OLS estimate while column 2 reports the IV estimate; Economic aid is
positive and significant in both. The third column reports an IV probit model to ensure that the
result does not depend on the linear link function. In the first stage, Inflation is positively correlated
with economic aid, as expected. The F-statistic for the excluded instruments exceeds the 5 percent
threshold for the Stock & Yogo (2005) weak ID test, indicating an excluded instrument set that is
strongly correlated with economic aid. Further, the C-statistic indicates that Inflation meets the
exclusion restriction, conditional on the assumption that the other excluded instruments are valid.
The IV estimate for Economic aid is larger than the OLS estimate. This difference would be
consistent with donors providing aid to countries that are less likely to transition to electoral mul-
tipartyism, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in June 1989 U.S. President
Bush welcomed Zairian President Mobutu as the first visiting African head of State during his
presidency, declaring him a close friend and staunch ally who deserved substantial financial sup-
port. By 1993, however, after the Clinton administration cut aid to Zaire, Mobutu declared “I
am the latest victim of the cold war, no longer needed by the U.S.” (Zagorin, 1993). One way to
gain leverage on this conjecture is to exclude the first years of the sample to see if the coefficients
converge. Indeed, when we exclude the first four years of the sample (with lagged aid measured
from 1986-1991) the respective linear coefficients are 0.075 (OLS) and 0.089 (IV), while the probit
coefficients are 0.302 (probit) and 0.310 (IV-probit).
The next three columns report corresponding models for democracy aid. Consistent with the
placebo tests in the bottom left panel of Figure 1b, the estimate for Democracy aid is slightly
smaller but not statistically significant in the two-stage models. The “Lewbel” instruments in this
sample for this measure of aid do not contribute much explanatory power in the first stage (as
shown by the relatively small F-statistic for I only) because the errors from the first stage equation
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do not have substantial heteroegeneity.19
To test the robustness of the Economic aid finding, we estimate specifications that: (1) include
additional controls variables; (2) employ only the “Lewbel” instruments and not Inflation; (3) add
two-way (time period and country) fixed effects; and (4) drop small island countries. Second, we
estimated the IV probit model when excluding one country at a time (Figure B1). Third, we
estimated “naive” fixed effects linear probability models with: (a) a quadratic time trend; and (b)
country-specific time trends (B3). The result for Economic aid remains in each of these tests.
Table 2 presents results for multiparty failure, with a similar set of specifications. Because
the dependent variable is multiparty failure, a negative coefficient estimate reflects a factor that
increases the likelihood of multiparty survival. The estimates for Economic aid suggest a null
finding; if anything the two-stage estimate indicates that this type of aid increases the chances of
multiparty failure (but it is not statistically different from zero). And while the F-statistic is below
the standard cut-points for weak ID tests, this results from the fact that the Lewbel instruments
add little explanatory power in the first stage (the F-statistic for I only is quite low). We obtain a
similar negative but insignificant estimate without the “Lewbel” instruments.
Turning to the estimates for Democracy aid, we find a consistent negative relationship with
multiparty failure. Both with and without the “Lewbel” instruments, the F-statistic is greater
than the thresholds indicating a weak instrument. Further, the C-statistic indicates that WiP
meets the exclusion restriction, conditional on the “Lewbel” instruments being valid.
To test the robustness of the Democracy aid finding, we estimate specifications that: (1) include
more control variables and no controls beyond duration; (2) employ only the “Lewbel” instruments
based on duration time; (3) add two-way (time period and country) fixed effects; and (4) drop
small island countries. Second, we estimate the IV probit model when excluding one country at a
time (Figure B1). Third, we estimate “naive” fixed effects linear models with: a quadratic time
19This causes the F-statistic for all excluded instruments (Z and I) to decrease. In Appendix
C, we report tests of heterogeneity in the first-stage to explore the extent to which the “Lewbel”
instruments boost efficiency. In Table C2, we report a similar null result for Democracy aid when
using only WiP as an excluded instrument, with a large F-statistic.
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trend; and country-specific time trends (B3). The result for Democracy aid remains.
The top panel of Figure 3 depicts a substantive interpretation of the findings for multipartyism.
The left panel uses the estimates from Table 1, model 3 to simulate the risk of multiparty transition
across values of economic aid. In this sample the outcome of interest occurs in 13 percent of
observation years. Increasing economic aid from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is
associated with an increase in the simulated transition risk from roughly 6 percent to 11 percent.
The right panel shows the simulations for democracy aid and multiparty failure from column 6,
Table 2. In this sample, multiparty failure occurs in just over 2 percent of observations. Increasing
democracy aid from the 25th pcentile to the 75th percentile reduces the simulated risk of breakdown
by over two-thirds, from 3.5 percent to 0.8 percent.20
Foreign aid and African elections
In this section we examine how foreign aid influences elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus far,
we have shown that economic aid increases the chances of transition to multiparty politics but
has little influence on the survival of multiparty politics. Democracy assistance, on the other
hand, has little influence on the introduction of multiparty politics but helps multipartyism persist.
However, this analysis, does not capture democratic consolidation outcomes that might threaten
the incumbent. One outcome that represents a potential threat to the incumbent’s ability to retain
power is electoral misconduct. A second outcome, which more directly threatens incumbents in
multiparty regimes, is stronger electoral support of opposition parties.
Electoral misconduct We look first at observed incumbent behavior during multiparty election
years, using an indicator of electoral malfeasance by the incumbent constructed from variables in
the NELDA data set: opposition harassment, preventing opposition parties from participating, and
violence involving civilian deaths (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). These concepts capture aspects of
20While the simulations indicate that the aid estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2 are substan-
tively important, the simulation estimates should not be interpreted literally because the absolute
size of the estimates reflects the observed incidence of the dependent variable in each of the samples.
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electoral misconduct using information from election observer reports. The dependent variable is
coded 1 if any of these types of misconduct occur during an election year; and 0 otherwise. Just
under one-half of multiparty election years are coded as incumbent misconduct.
The explanatory variables include foreign aid, GDP per capita (log), population (log), IMF
program participation, whether election monitors were present, and whether the election was the
first multiparty election.21 IMF program participation and the presence of election monitors may
shape aid allocation; and as Hyde and O’Mahony (2010) show, these factors also influence whether
the incumbent government attempts to win elections by focusing more on pre-electoral fiscal ma-
nipulation or direct manipulation such as vote stealing, intimidation, and harassing the opposition.
Again we use a two-stage linear probability model, and check results with an IV-probit.
The first three columns of Table 3 examine economic aid. While the estimates for Economic aid
are negative, they are not statistically different from zero; and the IV estimate is lower in absolute
size than the OLS estimate. The F-statistic indicates an instrument set that is strongly correlated
with economic aid; and the C-statistic suggests that Inflation is a valid instrument, conditional on
the assumption that the “Lewbel” instruments are valid.
The estimates for Democracy aid show no result in the OLS model, but yield negative and
significant estimates in the IV models. This suggests that the naive estimates may reflect donors
giving more governance aid prior to multiparty contests in low state-capacity countries where
electoral misconduct is likely, precisely because it is more difficult for the government to conduct
an election in these countries.22 This scenario would be consistent, for example, with donors
21The NELDA data include measures of whether the election was the first multiparty contest and
whether monitors are present. In robustness tests we show the results hold when adding further
control variables: economic growth, civil conflict, ethnic fractionalization, trade, IGOs, NGOs,
membership in IOs, migrant stock, and ally. Further controls from NELDA are indicators of
whether the incumbent expected to win the election and whether there was an opposition boycott.
22Using the “Lewbel” instruments in this sample for democracy aid lowers the overall F-stat
(Z + I) to about 10 because the F-stat for these ‘internal’ instrument (I) is small: 1.8. Re-
estimating the models with only Z and not I as an excluded instrument increases the F-stat such
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financing roughly 90 percent of the costs associated with the 2006 election in the DRC, which was
marred by violence (Kadima, Leonard and Schmidt, 2009, 24). The bottom panel of Figure 3 plots
the simulated effect of democracy aid on the probability of observing electoral misconduct, from
estimates in last column of Table 3. An increase in democracy aid from the 25th percentile to the
75th percentile lowers the simulated probability of misconduct from over 55 percent to 38 percent.
These findings are consistent with the results for multiparty breakdown: democracy assistance is
associated with a more democratic outcome, in this case a lower likelihood of electoral misconduct.
Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have little consistent influence on electoral misconduct.
The result for democracy aid is robust to additional control variables; and when dropping small
island countries or civil war years from the sample.
Electoral support for the opposition Does democracy aid increase the strength of opposi-
tion parties? Our measure of opposition electoral support is the percentage vote for the largest
opposition party (or candidate) as a share of the two-party vote: OO+I , where O is the vote share
for the largest opposition party and I is the vote share for the incumbent. This operationaliza-
tion circumvents issues related to the fragmentation of party systems by focusing on a continuous
measure of how close the largest opposition party is to defeating the incumbent at the polls. We
concentrate on first round executive elections after a transition to multiparty politics because these
contests pit the incumbent party against opposition candidates and capture support for the largest
opposition party. We fit a linear model with a log-transformed dependent variable to account for
the proportional nature of the vote share data.
Table 4 reports the results. Given the small number of observations, we use a minimum of
control variables: GDP per capita, population, economic growth, and IMF program participation.
The first three columns examine economic aid, the latter three democracy aid. For each, we report
a naive model, an IV model, and one with the sample restricted to elections in which the incumbent
wins less than 90% of the vote, as was the case in Equatorial Guinea in 1996 and 2002.23
that it easily passes weak instrument tests. Further, the C-statistic indicates that WiP is a valid
instrument, conditional on the others being valid.
23Of the 84 elections in the sample, the largest opposition party takes at least 10% of the vote
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The estimate for Economic aid is positive in the naive model but becomes negative in the
IV model, though neither estimate is different from zero. We find a consistent negative estimate
for economic aid in various alternative IV specifications reported in the Appendix, but none of
the estimates are statistically different from zero. Despite the lack of statstical significane, this
suggests that once we account for endogeneity, economic aid might hurt electoral competitiveness.
For democracy aid, the naive and the IV estimate on the full sample yield positive estimates but
these findings hinge entirely on including elections where the incumbent wins handily, as illustrated
by the null finding in column 6. Democracy aid has little influence on opposition support in elections
that are minimally competitive. The F- and C-statistics indicate valid instruments.
An aid curse?
Several studies posit that aid inhibits democracy by reducing political accountability for recipient
governments (Remmer, 2004; Moss and van de Walle, 2008). Non-tax revenue such as aid relieves
the state of taxing citizens, which may reduce citizens’ incentive to demand accountability (Djankov
and Reynal-Querol, 2008, 172). Recent studies, however, find that aid does not hurt tax effort
(Carter, 2013; Morrissey, 2014) and has few deleterious effects on democracy post-1989 (Bermeo,
2011, 2013). While our findings suggest that economic aid helped purchase multiparty transitions
in Africa – a finding consistent with aid curse dissenters (Dunning, 2004; Wright, 2009; Bermeo,
2011) – this form of aid is nonetheless associated with an increased risk of multiparty failure and
lower opposition vote shares (though neither of these results are statistically significant). That
said, the aid curse literature focuses on economic, not democracy, assistance. We find that though
democracy assistance is associated with more stable multiparty systems and fair elections, there is
little evidence that it helps the electoral opposition. Thus, once we examine different types of foreign
aid and distinct aspects of democratic politics, the findings do not fit neatly with “aid curse” or “aid
blessing” labels. Rather, the picture is more complicated because we account for donor strategies
and the possibility that some forms of political change – such as multiparty transitions and fair
in 70 cases, but fails to reach this threshold in 14 cases. These 14 cases receive roughly half the
democracy aid (on average) than the other 70 cases: $2.3 per capita vs. $4.0.
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elections – are not necessarily threatening to incumbents.
Conclusion
The findings suggest several insights into the relationship between foreign aid, democratic tran-
sition and consolidation in Africa. While economic aid is a catalyst for transitions to multiparty
party regimes, democracy aid stabilizes multiparty regimes and decreases the incidence of electoral
misconduct, which we interpret as increasing horizontal accountability. Importantly, neither of
these outcomes may necessarily threaten incumbent governments in institutionalized multiparty
regimes. However, we find little evidence that either economic or democracy aid increases the
competitiveness of the opposition, which is a necessary condition for incumbent turnover. This
sugggests that the primary channel through which democracy promotion occurs is government-led
political reform. In short, we find evidence consistent with both the leverage mechanism linking
economic aid to multiparty transitions as well as the investment mechanism linking democracy aid
to consolidation outcomes – but only those that do not necessarily threaten incumbents.
Despite the rhetoric about strengthening civil society, we show that donors largely pursue
democracy promotion through governance aid, with predictable effects on maintaining a stable
multiparty electoral system. If the goal of democracy promotion is to increase opposition strength
and, more broadly, consolidate democracy through channels that improve vertical accountability, we
would expect donors to directly invest in opposition parties and civil society groups. This in turn,
should promote vertical accountability by increasing the electoral strength of opposition parties.
If, on the other hand, democracy aid largely targets governance programs and is implemented by
incumbent parties, it is less likely that external democracy promotion yields reform outcomes that
put incumbents at risk of losing power. Instead democracy aid may perpetuate a multiparty system
in which incumbents retain power. Thus our finding for multiparty transitions and failure dovetails
with Crawford Young’s (1999, 35) claim that “semi-democracy is probably sufficient to deflect
international system pressures for more complete political opening, particularly if macroeconomic
management earns external approbation.”
While our results are robust to excluding post-civil conflict periods from the tests of multiparty
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stability, more can be done to account conflict’s consequences on processes of democratic change.
As Flores and Nooruddin (2009) and Flores and Nooruddin (2012) show, aid flows often spike
during post-conflict periods. Future research should further investigate the political consequences
of post-conflict-induced aid.
Finally, even though we find little evidence that democracy assistance strengthens opposition
parties in elections, we cannot rule out the possibility that democracy promotion efforts that im-
prove other consolidation outcomes – such as maintaining a stable multiparty regime and improving
the conduct of elections – will bolster opposition parties at the polls in the future. A more level
playing field may induce further domestic investment in opposition groups down the road.
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Table 1: Foreign aid and transitions to multipartyism
IV IV IV IV
OLS OLS probit OLS OLS probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic aid 0.058** 0.108** 0.473*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.25)
Democracy aid 0.073** 0.067 0.428
(0.03) (0.07) (0.54)
Log GDP pc 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12)
Log population 0.021 0.041** 0.169 0.010 0.009 0.060
(0.01) (0.02) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)
Civil war -0.114** -0.109** -0.654** -0.123** -0.123** -0.714**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04) (0.28)
(Intercept) -0.135 -0.452 -3.568** 0.085 0.098 -1.568
(0.25) (0.31) (1.71) (0.22) (0.24) (1.44)
Economic aid Democracy aid
Inflation 0.161**
(0.05)
WiP 0.042**
(0.01)
Log GDP pc 0.111 0.025
(0.10) (0.06)
Log population -0.328** -0.198**
(0.05) (0.04)
Civil war -0.174 -0.022
(0.13) (0.14)
IGDP 0.172 -0.072
(0.15) (0.16)
Ipop 0.182* -0.096
(0.10) (0.10)
Icivwar -0.273 0.206
(0.33) (0.33)
Id1 -0.027 0.193**
(0.09) (0.09)
Id2 -0.001 -0.009**
(0.00) (0.00)
Id3 0.000 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00)
(Intercept) 4.475** 1.268**
(0.76) (0.58)
F-statistic (Z) 9.5 19.2
F-statistic (I) 23.4 3.9
F-statistic (Z & I) 22.6 7.2
5% maximal IV relative bias 19.9 19.8
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.3 11.3
p-value (C-statistic) 0.25 0.31
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. Duration polynomials (3) not reported. F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F statistic. N×T = 370 observations in 44 countries from 1989-2008. First-stage F-statstic
based on 43 degrees of freedom.
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Table 2: Foreign aid and multiparty failure
IV IV IV IV
OLS OLS probit OLS OLS probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic aid -0.015 0.043 0.533
(0.01) (0.04) (0.37)
Democracy aid -0.030** -0.043* -0.637*
(0.01) (0.03) (0.39)
Log GDP pc -0.012 -0.012 -0.222* -0.017** -0.020** -0.381**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.18)
Log population -0.011 0.008 0.096 -0.011* -0.013* -0.190*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10)
Civil war 0.059 0.070 0.588 0.057 0.054 0.471
(0.06) (0.06) (0.40) (0.06) (0.06) (0.41)
(Intercept) -0.708** -1.092** -2.767 -0.692** -0.642** 3.361*
(0.14) (0.26) (2.75) (0.11) (0.15) (2.03)
Economic aid Democracy aid
Inflation 0.276**
(0.05)
WiP 5.556**
(0.01)
Log GDP pc 0.020 -0.094
(0.07) (0.06)
Log population -0.314** -0.204**
(0.04) (0.04)
Civil war -0.152 -0.191*
(0.14) (0.12)
IGDP 0.137 -0.030
(0.16) (0.13)
Ipop 0.001 -0.205**
(0.10) (0.07)
Icivwar -0.354 -0.248
(0.62) (0.56)
Id1 -0.354 -0.114*
(0.08) (0.06)
Id2 -0.002 0.007
(0.01) (0.00)
Id3 0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
(Intercept) 5.556** 2.257**
(0.72) (0.67)
F-statistic (Z) 28.7 47.7
F-statistic (I) 0.9 3.7
F-statistic (Z & I) 7.6 23.7
5% maximal IV relative bias 19.9 19.8
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.3 11.3
p-value (C-statistic) 0.48 0.73
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. Duration polynomials (3) not reported. F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic. N×T = 583 observations in 44 countries from 1989-2008.
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Table 3: Foreign aid and electoral misconduct
IV IV IV IV
OLS OLS probit OLS OLS probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic aid -0.099 -0.068 -0.193
(0.08) (0.08) (0.29)
Democracy aid -0.035 -0.175* -0.466*
(0.06) (0.10) (0.27)
Log GDP pc -0.019 -0.025 -0.066 -0.041 -0.046 -0.117
(0.07) (0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.16)
Log population 0.023 0.031 0.075 0.042 0.023 0.052
(0.06) (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
IMF program 0.011 -0.006 -0.004 -0.031 0.010 0.035
(0.14) (0.15) (0.41) (0.13) (0.13) (0.31)
First election 0.130 0.116 0.306 0.082 0.068 0.163
(0.12) (0.12) (0.34) (0.12) (0.11) (0.29)
Monitor -0.060 -0.053 -0.140 -0.043 -0.055 -0.148
(0.14) (0.13) (0.35) (0.14) (0.13) (0.35)
(Intercept) 0.810 0.676 0.562 0.474 0.837 0.940
(0.68) (0.70) (1.98) (0.59) (0.65) (1.62)
Economic aid Democracy aid
Inflation 0.090**
(0.04)
WiP 0.083**
(0.01)
Log GDP pc 0.258** -0.004
(0.05) (0.06)
Log population -0.171** -0.185**
(0.05) (0.05)
IMF program 0.481** 0.225
(0.10) (0.15)
First election 0.293** 0.315**
(0.13) (0.12)
Monitor -0.089 -0.262**
(0.11) (0.11)
IGDP 0.141 -0.231*
(0.12) (0.12)
IPop 0.122* -0.238**
(0.06) (0.10)
IIMF -1.016** -0.201
(0.17) (0.19)
IFirst -0.447 -0.008
(0.42) (0.21)
IMonitor 0.090 -0.131
(0.30) (032)
(Intercept) 3.083** 1.245*
(0.61) (0.68
F-statistic (Z) 4.8 42.7
F-statistic (I ) 27.1 1.8
F-statistic (Z & I) 27.4 10.5
5% maximal IV relative bias 19.3 19.3
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.1 11.1
p-value (C-statistic) 0.15 0.21
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. 170 election years
in 40 countries from 1989-2008.
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Table 4: Foreign aid and opposition vote share
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic aid 0.262 -0.361 -0.273
(0.32) (0.29) (0.21)
Democracy aid 0.578** 1.002** 0.146
(0.26) (0.44) (0.25)
Log GDP pc -0.193 -0.113 -0.210** -0.088 -0.036 -0.213**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.10)
Log population 0.011 -0.185 -0.227** 0.018 0.083 -0.108
(0.19) (0.18) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08)
Growth -0.021 -0.027 -0.004 -0.032 -0.038* -0.007
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IMF program -0.096 0.136 0.250 -0.197 -0.343 0.080
(0.33) (0.31) (0.22) (0.32) (0.37) (0.25)
(Intercept) -0.587 2.897 3.905** -0.994 -2.367 1.720
(3.06) (2.98) (1.35) (2.14) (2.45) (1.49)
Economic aid Democracy aid
Inflation 0.178** 0.164**
(0.05) (0.05)
WiP 0.073** 0.081**
(0.02) (0.03)
Log GDP pc 0.204** 0.200** 0.009 -0.027
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Log population -0.289** -0.322** -0.200** -0.211**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Growth -0.000 0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF program 0.428** 0.502** 0.507** 0.487**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
IGDP -0.057 -0.055 -0.116 -0.098
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17)
IPop -0.021 0.013 -0.242** -0.240**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09)
IGrowth 0.026** 0.040** -0.042** -0.035**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
IIMF -0.889** -1.076** -0.094 -0.267
(0.23) (0.20) (0.30) (0.35)
(Intercept) 4.383** 4.707** 1.155 1.384
(0.87) (0.77) (0.97) (1.13)
F-statistic (Z) 15.3 9.4 10.8 7.6
F-statistic (I) 13.7 13.4 12.8 7.3
F-statistic (Z & I) 22.5 15.5 19.1 12.8
5% maximal IV relative bias 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4
10% maximal IV relative bias 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
p-value (C-statistic) 0.19 0.51 0.20 0.22
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic. 84 elections in
columns 1-2, 4-5; 70 elections in columns 3 and 6. 31 countries from 1989-2008. /Clustered
standard errors reported.
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(a) Foreign aid trends over time
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(b) Aid dividend from multiparty transition and collapse
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Figure 1: Foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. Top panel shows economic aid and democracy and
governance aid (DGA). Total is constant USD in millions. Per capita is constant USD averaged across 48
countries. Two year moving average (t, t-1). Bottom panel shows the percent change in aid in the three years
after multiparty transition (failure) relative to three years prior to transition (failure). Each panel shows
the average change for economic aid, democracy aid, and two categories of democracy aid (civil society and
government). Estimates in bottom panel obtained from a country fixed effects regression with controls for
civil war, 1989-2008. Sources: AidData.org and authors’ calculation.
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Figure 2: Democracy and Governance Aid (DGA), share of total aid by year. Left panel:
large bars depict DGAAllAid ; small, darker bars depict
CivilSocietyAid
TotalDGA . Right panel: large bars depict
DGA
AllAid ; small, darker bars depict
U.S.DGA
TotalDGA . Two-year (t, t-1) moving average of yearly shares in
constant dollars. Sources: AidData.org, WDI (2010), and authors’ calculation.
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(a) Foreign aid and multipartyism
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(b) Democracy aid & electoral misconduct
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Figure 3: Foreign aid and democratic consolidation. Top panel shows the substantive effect
of foreign aid on multiparty transition and failure. Horizontal axes measure aid and vertical axes
represent the simulated risk of transition or failure. Shaded histograms are the distribution of aid
in the sample. All control variables set at within-sample means or medians. Bottom panel shows
substantive relationship between democracy aid and electoral misconduct. Years: 1989-2008.
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Abstract
Over the past two decades, donors increasingly link foreign aid to democracy objectives in Africa.
This study investigates whether and how foreign aid influences specific outcomes associated
with democratic transition and consolidation. Using an instrumental variables approach for
the period from 1989 to 2008, we show that economic aid increases the likelihood of transition
to multiparty politics, while democracy aid furthers democratic consolidation by reducing the
incidence of multiparty failure and electoral misconduct. However, we find little evidence that
either economic or democracy aid influences opposition support in multiparty elections. These
findings have implications for how understanding how donors allocate aid and the political
consequences of foreign assistance in Africa.
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Appendix A: Data
Table A-1: Multipartyism
Country Start End Country Start End
Angola 1993 censored Liberia 1986 1990
Benin 1992 censored Liberia 1998 2002
Botswana 1967† censored Liberia 2006 censored
Burkina Faso 1993 censored Madagascar 1994 censored
Burundi 1994 1994 Malawi 1995 censored
Burundi 2006 censored Mali 1993 censored
Cameroon 1993 censored Mauritania 1993 2005
Cape Verde 1992 censored Mauritania 2007 2008
Central African Rep. 1994 2003 Mauritius 1969† censored
Central African Rep. 2006 censored Mozambique 1995 censored
Chad 1998 censored Namibia 1995 censored
Comoros 1993 1996 Niger 1994 1996
Comoros 2005 censored Niger 1997 1999
Congo Br. 1993 1997 Niger 2000 censored
Congo Br. 2003 censored Nigeria 1993 1993
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1991 1999 Nigeria 2000 censored
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2001 censored Rwanda 2004 censored
Congo DR 2007 censored Sa˜o Tome 1992 censored
Equatorial Guinea 1994 censored Senegal 1979† censored
Ethiopia 1996 censored Seychelles 1994 censored
Gabon 1991 censored Sierra Leone 1997 1997
Gambia 1967† 1994 Sierra Leone 2003 censored
Gambia 1998 censored South Africa 1994 censored
Ghana 1997 censored Sudan 1987† 1989
Guinea 1996 censored Tanzania 1996 censored
Guinea-Bissau 1995 2003 Togo 1995 censored
Guinea-Bissau 2005 censored Uganda 2007 censored
Kenya 1993 censored Zambia 1992 censored
Lesotho 1999 censored Zimbabwe 1981† censored
Start year coded for first year when multipartyism is observed on January 1;
this is typically the year after the first multiparty election. † indicates left-
censored at 1989; censored ≡ right-censored in 2008.
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Table A-2: Multiparty failure events
Country Date Event description
Burundi 10 September 1994 Frodebu agrees to Government Convention to dampen threat of violence. The
institutional change created a governing body, the Convention, that superceded
the 1992 constitution and ended Frodebu’s defacto 1993 legislative victory.
Reyntjens (2009, 37) writes, “the constitution was shelved and the outcome of
both the presidential and parliamentary elections was swept aside as the president
and parliament were placed under the trusteeship of an unconstitutional body.”
Central African Rep. 15 March 2003 Bozize´ coup (Debos 2008, 229). His troops took Bangui, suspended the
constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and the elected leader (Patasse´) fled.
Comoros 1 December 1996 The 1996 legislative elections were boycotted by opposition parties. Only 3 of
43 contested seats won by an alternative party which supported the ruling RND
(Inter-parliamentary Union, 1996).
Congo-Brazzaville 14 October 1997 Sassou-Nguesso’s militia, backed by Angolan troops, ousted the Lissouba
government from the presidential palace (Clark 1998, 35). Sassou-Nguesso
elected a transition advisory legislature in 1998 and announced a transition to
democracy but no new legislature was elected.
Coˆte d’Ivoire 24 Demember 1999 Gen. Gue¨ı ousts the Be´die´ government. Gue¨ı amends the constitution in 2000
to exclude Outtara from the presidential contest (Daddieh 2001, 18). Gue¨ı
declares himself winner of the October 2000 elections, despite losing the vote.
Gambia 22 July 1994 The Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) seized power in a military
coup, deposing the government of Sir Dawda Jawara. Lieutenant Jammeh,
chairman of the AFPRC, suspended the Constitution, banned opposition parties,
and held flawed elections in 1996 and 1997 (Saine 2002, 168).
Guinea-Bissau 14 September 2003 Coup ousts Yala. President Yala dissolves Parliament on 15 November 2012,
promises and then postpones new elections (Election Guide; Malan 2005, 13).
Transitional government under a military junta holds new elections in 2005.
Liberia 9 September 1990 Doe’s government toppled when Prince Johnson’s rebel forces kill Doe and capture
Monrovia. An international interim government put in place, but Taylor controlled
most of the territory (Reno 1999, 93).
Liberia 2 April 2002 Elections that were scheduled for 2003 never took place. A ban on political parties
took effect on 2 April 2002 under February-September State of Emergency
(Outram 2003, 604).
Mauritania 3 August 2005 President Taya was deposed in a bloodless coup (N’Diaye 2006). The ruling military
council (CMJD) led by Colonel Vall dissolved Parliament (Pazzanita 2008, 132).
New Constituent Assembly elected in November/December 2006.
Mauritania 6 August 2008 President Abdallahi was overthrown in a bloodless coup. The country was officially
run by a 12-member High State Council (HSC) composed entirely of military
officers (N’Diaye 2009).
Niger 27 January 1996 Bare´ Ma¨ınassara coup replaces President Mahamane Ousmane. The ruling
military council (Conseil de Salut National) suspended the Constitution and political
parties, and dissolved the National Assembly (Englebert 2003, 794).
Niger 9 April 1999 Ma¨ınassara assassinated by members of his predisential guard. Prime Minister
Mayaki dissolved the assembly and political parties and two days later the military
junta (CRN) led by Gen. Wanke “suspended the constitution and formally dissolved
the government” (Political Handbook of the World, 2012).
Nigeria 16 June 1993 Babangida via the National Election Council (NEC) annuls 1993 presidential election.
Babangida promises new elections (twice) but Abacha forces him to resign in
November 1993 (Political Handbook of the World, 2012).
Sierra Leone 25 May 1997 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma,
overthrow President Kabbah (Reno 1999, 138).
Sudan 30 June 1989 Coup led by Col al-Bashir and an Islamist faction of the military ousted the elected
government (Burr and Collins 2003, 1).
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Table A-3: Electoral misconduct during election years
Country Year Misconduct Country Year Misconduct Country Year Misconduct
Angola 1992 1 Gabon 1990 1 Mauritania 2006 0
Angola 2008 1 Gabon 1993 1 Mauritania 2007 1
Benin 1991 1 Gabon 1996 0 Mauritius 1991 0
Benin 1995 0 Gabon 1997 0 Mauritius 1995 0
Benin 1996 0 Gabon 1998 0 Mauritius 2000 0
Benin 1999 0 Gabon 2001 0 Mauritius 2005 0
Benin 2001 0 Gabon 2005 0 Mozambique 1994 0
Benin 2003 1 Gabon 2006 0 Mozambique 1999 0
Benin 2006 0 Gambia 1992 0 Mozambique 2004 0
Benin 2007 0 Gambia 1997 0 Namibia 1994 0
Botswana 1989 0 Gambia 2001 1 Namibia 1999 0
Botswana 1994 0 Gambia 2002 0 Namibia 2004 0
Botswana 1999 0 Gambia 2006 0 Niger 1993 1
Botswana 2004 0 Gambia 2007 0 Niger 1995 0
Burkina Faso 1992 0 Ghana 1996 1 Niger 2004 0
Burkina Faso 1997 0 Ghana 2000 1 Nigeria 1992 1
Burkina Faso 1998 0 Ghana 2004 1 Nigeria 1999 1
Burkina Faso 2002 0 Ghana 2008 0 Nigeria 2003 1
Burkina Faso 2005 0 Guinea 1995 1 Nigeria 2007 1
Burkina Faso 2007 0 Guinea 1998 1 Rwanda 2003 1
Burundi 1993 0 Guinea 2002 0 Rwanda 2008 0
Burundi 2005 0 Guinea 2003 1 Senegal 1993 1
Cameroon 1992 1 Guinea-Bissau 1994 0 Senegal 1998 1
Cameroon 1997 1 Guinea-Bissau 1999 1 Senegal 2000 0
Cameroon 2002 0 Guinea-Bissau 2000 1 Senegal 2001 0
Cameroon 2004 0 Guinea-Bissau 2004 0 Senegal 2007 0
Cameroon 2007 0 Guinea-Bissau 2005 0 Sierra Leone 1996 1
Central African Republic 1993 0 Guinea-Bissau 2008 1 Sierra Leone 2002 0
Central African Republic 1998 0 Kenya 1992 1 Sierra Leone 2007 1
Central African Republic 1999 1 Kenya 1994 1 South Africa 1994 1
Central African Republic 2005 1 Kenya 1997 1 South Africa 1999 0
Chad 1997 0 Kenya 2002 1 South Africa 2004 0
Chad 2001 0 Kenya 2007 1 Tanzania 1995 0
Chad 2002 0 Lesotho 1998 1 Tanzania 2000 0
Chad 2006 0 Lesotho 2002 0 Tanzania 2005 0
Comoros 1992 1 Lesotho 2007 1 Togo 1994 1
Comoros 1993 1 Liberia 1997 0 Togo 1998 1
Comoros 2004 0 Liberia 2005 0 Togo 1999 0
Comoros 2006 0 Madagascar 1993 0 Togo 2002 0
Congo 1992 0 Madagascar 1996 0 Togo 2003 1
Congo 1993 1 Madagascar 1998 0 Togo 2005 1
Congo 2002 1 Madagascar 2001 1 Togo 2007 0
Congo 2007 0 Madagascar 2002 0 Uganda 2006 1
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1990 1 Madagascar 2006 1 Zambia 1991 0
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1995 1 Madagascar 2007 1 Zambia 1995 0
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2000 1 Malawi 1994 1 Zambia 1996 1
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2001 1 Malawi 1999 1 Zambia 2001 1
Democratic Republic of Congo 2006 1 Malawi 2004 0 Zambia 2006 0
Equatorial Guinea 1993 1 Mali 1992 0 Zambia 2008 0
Equatorial Guinea 1996 1 Mali 1997 1 Zimbabwe 1990 1
Equatorial Guinea 1999 1 Mali 2002 0 Zimbabwe 1995 1
Equatorial Guinea 2002 1 Mali 2007 0 Zimbabwe 1996 0
Equatorial Guinea 2004 1 Mauritania 1992 1 Zimbabwe 2000 1
Equatorial Guinea 2008 1 Mauritania 1996 1 Zimbabwe 2002 1
Ethiopia 1995 1 Mauritania 1997 0 Zimbabwe 2005 1
Ethiopia 2000 1 Mauritania 2001 1 Zimbabwe 2008 1
Ethiopia 2005 1 Mauritania 2003 1
Multiparty elections years: 1989-2008. Electoral misconduct source: NELDA13, NELDA 15, NELDA 31 and NELDA 33
from NELDA version 3.0, Hyde and Marinov (2012).
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Table A-5: Democracy Aid, purposes defined by AidData (2010)
Economic and development policy and planning
Macro-economic, fiscal and monetary policy and planning
Institutional capacity building, Government
Support to other ministries and government departments when sector cannot be specified
Development planning and preparation of structural reforms
Public sector financial management
Improving financial management systems
Tax assessment procedures
Measures against waste, fraud and corruption
Legal and judicial development
Constitutional development, legal drafting
Institutional strengthening of legal and judicial systems
Legal training and education
Legal advice and services
Crime prevention
Government administration
General government services not elsewhere specified
Systems of government
Civil service reform
Government infrastructure
Strengthening civil society
Strengthening civil society, activity unspecified or does not fit elsewhere in group
Community participation and development
Cooperatives
Grassroots organizations
Other participatory planning and decision making procedures and institutions
Elections
Human rights
Free flow of information
Women’s equality organizations and institutions
Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security
Security system management and reform
Other security assistance
Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
Support for civilian peace-building activities
Post-conflict peace-building (UN)
UN post-conflict peace-building activities
Reintegration and small arms, light weapons (SALW) control
Reintegration of demobilised military personnel into the economy
Conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs
Assistance to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of SALW
Land mine clearance
Explosive mine removal
Child soldiers (Prevention and demobilisation)
Support to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers
Support to demobilize child soldiers
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Table A-6: Summary statistics, Table 1
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Multiparty 0.12 0.34 0 1 370
Economic aid 3.7 1 0.2 6.4 370
Democracy aid 0.9 0.7 0 2.9 370
Log GDP pc 6.9 0.8 4.8 9.6 370
Log population 8.6 1.5 4.2 11.7 370
Civil war 0.2 0.4 0 1 370
Duration 25.2 13.3 1 50 370
Duration2 809.7 620.8 1 2500 370
Duration3 28301 27742.7 1 125000 370
Inflation 2.9 1.1 1 7.8 370
WiP 16.2 5.1 4.4 31.8 370
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Table A-7: Summary statistics, Table 2
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Multiparty 0.97 0.16 0 1 583
Economic aid 3.9 0.8 0.5 6.2 583
Democracy aid 1.3 0.7 0 3.2 583
Log GDP pc 7.2 1 5.1 10.2 583
Log population 8.5 1.6 4.3 11.9 583
Civil war 0.1 0.2 0 1 583
Duration 9.2 7.5 0 39 583
Duration2 141.5 229 0 1521 583
Duration3 2919.2 7187.2 0 59319 583
Inflation 2.2 0.7 1.1 5.1 583
WiP 20.1 3.8 6.1 26.1 583
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Table A-8: Summary statistics, Table 3
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Electoral misconduct 0.47 0.50 0 1
Economic aid 3.9 0.7 0.3 5.7
Democracy aid 1.2 0.6 0 3
Log GDP pc 7.1 0.9 5.1 9.8
Log population 8.7 1.3 6 11.9
IMF program 0.5 0.4 0 1
First multiparty election 0.1 0.3 0 1
Election monitor 0.9 0.3 0 1
Inflation 2.3 0.8 1.3 5.1
WiP 19.5 4 7 25.7
N 170
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Table A-9: Summary statistics, Table 4
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Opp vote share -1 1.3 -4.9 4.1
Economic aid 4 0.8 2.3 5.9
Democracy aid 1.3 0.7 0.1 3
Log GDP pc 7.3 1.1 5.1 10
Log population 8.5 1.7 4.3 11.9
Growth 3.5 7.4 -14.6 38.2
IMF program 0.6 0.5 0 1
Inflation 2.1 0.6 1.1 4.7
WiP 20.4 3.5 10 25.7
N 84
9
Appendix B: Additional results
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Table B-1: Additional tests for multiparty transition
(1)a (2)b (3)c (4)d (5)e (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Econ aid 0.083** 0.117** 0.127* 0.107** 0.083** 0.094** 0.101** 0.103** 0.110** 0.106** 0.104** 0.106** 0.106** 0.107** 0.109**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Log GDP pc 0.003 0.004 0.045 0.005 0.001 -0.018 0.007 0.004 -0.033** 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.019 0.011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Log pop 0.031* 0.044** 0.518* 0.043** 0.045** 0.026 0.039** 0.042** 0.004 0.041** 0.044** 0.042** 0.000 0.046**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.30) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Civil war -0.112** -0.108** -0.046 -0.110** -0.124** -0.100** -0.110** -0.110** -0.094** -0.109** -0.109** -0.110** -0.120** -0.118**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ethnic frac. -0.047
(0.08)
Oil rents pc 0.022**
(0.01)
IMF program 0.027
(0.05)
Growth -0.000
(0.00)
Trade 0.045**
(0.01)
Intl NGO 0.020
(0.09)
Dom. NGO 0.042
(0.09)
Migrant stock -0.004
(0.01)
IO member 0.008**
(0.00)
Alliance 0.128**
(0.03)
(Intercept) -0.297 -0.513* -0.469 -0.041 -0.379 -0.183 -0.452 -0.467 -0.181 -0.439 -0.454 -0.451 -0.398 -0.583**
(0.32) (0.28) (0.32) (0.11) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29)
F-statistic 19.8 15.1 10.0 20.4 14.8 16.6 20.8 26.3 25.6 22.5 18.9 19.5 21.8 23.6 23.7
C (p-value) 0.46 0.36 0.37 0.72 0.26 0.30 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.30
Countries 44 44 44 42 44 39 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
Observations 370 370 370 362 370 332 362 370 369 370 370 370 370 370 370
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. IV models with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration polynomials included in all models but not reported. a ≡ only Lewbel instruments (no
Inflation); b ≡ Inflation + Lewbel instruments based on duration polynomials; c ≡ two-way fixed effects (time period and country); d ≡ drop island countries; e ≡ no control
variables.
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Table B-2: Additional tests for multiparty failure
(1)a (2)b (3)c (4)d (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Democracy aid 0.055† 0.047†† 0.059* 0.081* 0.052** 0.053* 0.043+ 0.043* 0.044* 0.044* 0.046* 0.043* 0.047* 0.045*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log GDP pc 0.022** -0.026 0.018* 0.021** 0.019* 0.018* 0.019** 0.034** 0.016* 0.014+ 0.019** 0.022** 0.022**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log population 0.015** 0.083 0.020** 0.013* 0.018** 0.013* 0.013* 0.024** 0.021** 0.023** 0.013* 0.017** 0.013*
(0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Civil war -0.052 -0.096 -0.056 -0.053 -0.056 -0.055 -0.055 -0.057 -0.059 -0.058 -0.054 -0.061 -0.052
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Ethnic frac. -0.016
(0.03)
Oil rents pc 0.000
(0.00)
IMF program -0.007
(0.02)
Growth 0.000
(0.00)
Trade -0.014
(0.01)
Intl. NGO 0.059*
(0.04)
Domestic NGO 0.065*
(0.04)
Migrant stock 0.001
(0.01)
IO member -0.001
(0.00)
Alliance -0.034
(0.03)
(Intercept) 0.600** 0.571** 0.830** 0.628** 0.587** 0.654** 0.645** 0.536** 0.591** 0.585** 0.645** 0.623** 0.627**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
F-stat 21.8 5.9 16.4 12.0 11.8 15.6 24.8 22.4 21.7 25.2 24.8 21.4 19.7 23.7
C-stat (p-value) 0.772 0.897 0.727 0.951 0.596 0.827 0.947 0.843 0.980 0.983 0.917 0.834 0.951
Countries 44 43 41 44 40 42 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
Observations 583 582 531 583 526 551 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 583
†† p<0.18; † p<0.11; ∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. IV models with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration polynomials included in all models but not reported.
a ≡ Inflation + Lewbel instruments based on duration polynomials; b ≡ two-way fixed effects (time period and country); c ≡ drop island countries; d ≡ no control
variables.
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Table B-3: Linear probability models with unit FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic aid 0.065 0.123** 0.068*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Democracy aid 0.050** 0.051** 0.039*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(Intercept) -0.031 -0.589** -1.067** 0.800** 0.889** 0.926**
(0.17) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y N N Y N N
Time trend N Y N N Y N
Country specific-time trend N N Y N N Y
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. OLS with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Civil war control
variable not reported.
An alternative approach to constructing causal estimates that does not rely on external instru-
ments to identify the “exogenous” variation in foreign aid is to estimate fixed-effects models. This
approach assumes that the unit fixed-effect “controls” for unobserved confounders. In our applica-
tion, we model unit fixed effects in combination with three methods of accounting for a calendar
time trend in the data: year fixed effects; a common time trend; and a country-specific time trend.
Because we include subtantial cross-section variation in the unit-fixed effects, we drop GDP per
capita and population as control variables, but retain the time-varying measure of civil war. To
avoid separation issues that arise in a limited dependent variable model, we employ a linear prob-
ability model. In all specification reported in Table B-3, the main reported results from Tables
1 (multiparty transition) and 2 (multiparty failure) remain. We cannot employ this approach for
the models of electoral misconduct and opposition electoral strength because there are too few
observations per cross-section unit to reliably estimate a fixed effects model.
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Table B-4: Additional tests for electoral misconduct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)a (13)b
Democracy aid -0.174* -0.154* -0.170* -0.179* -0.215** -0.149+ -0.200** -0.167* -0.172* -0.138+ -0.186* -0.218** -0.146+
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Log GDP pc -0.055 -0.049 -0.046 -0.055 -0.054 -0.183 -0.111** 0.003 -0.028 -0.062 -0.028 -0.029 -0.052
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Log population 0.019 0.033 0.024 0.023 0.034 -0.100 0.199** -0.064 0.039 -0.054 0.014 0.011 0.017
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
IMF program 0.004 -0.022 0.008 0.004 -0.046 0.090 0.019 -0.027 0.044 0.031 -0.005 0.004 -0.003
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
First election 0.092 0.073 0.069 0.071 0.034 0.080 0.091 0.035 0.027 0.075 0.065 0.053 0.024
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Monitor -0.034 -0.036 -0.055 -0.058 -0.019 -0.006 -0.055 -0.081 -0.060 -0.014 -0.048 -0.100 -0.027
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Expect win 0.137
(0.09)
Boycott 0.161
(0.10)
Civil war -0.007
(0.15)
Growth 0.003
(0.01)
Ethinc frac. 0.141
(0.25)
Trade 0.157*
(0.08)
Intl NGO 2.838**
(1.08)
Domestic NGO -1.130
(0.90)
IO member -0.004
(0.00)
Migrant stock 0.138**
(0.04)
Alliance -0.181
(0.13)
(Intercept) 0.844 0.707 0.824 0.901 0.763 1.707* -0.486 1.485 0.800 1.186* 0.815 0.931 0.881
(0.65) (0.61) (0.65) (0.65) (0.68) (1.03) (0.87) (0.92) (0.62) (0.64) (0.61) (0.69) (0.65)
F-statistic 10.4 9.8 10.6 10.3 9.5 10.3 11.5 11.0 11.7 10.7 10.4 9.8 10.5
C (p-value) 0.226 0.286 0.204 0.203 0.285 0.168 0.122 0.285 0.217 0.127 0.210 0.153 0.258
Countries 40 40 40 40 38 40 40 40 40 40 40 39 39
Observations 170 170 170. 170 159 170 170 170 170 170 170 166 158
+ p<0.15 ∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. IV models with clustered standard errors in parentheses. a ≡ drop island countries; b ≡ drop civil war years.
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Table B-5: Opposition vote share of total vote
(1) (2) (3)a (4)a
Economic aid -0.122 -0.271
(0.27) (0.20)
Democracy aid 0.684* 0.054
(0.38) (0.27)
Log GDP pc 0.001 0.070 -0.098 -0.116
(0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.13)
Log population -0.080 0.064 -0.179** -0.076
(0.16) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
Growth -0.034 -0.043* -0.012 -0.014
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IMF program 0.037 -0.243 0.341 0.206
(0.24) (0.30) (0.27) (0.26)
(Intercept) 0.865 -2.030 3.164** 1.334
(2.69) (2.27) (1.30) (1.67)
F-statistic 22.5 19.0 15.4 12.8
C (p-value) 0.337 0.093 0.207 0.121
Countries 34 34 31 31
Election years 84 84 70 70
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. IV models with clustered stan-
dard errors in parentheses. a ≡ Incumbent vote share
<90%.
Table B-5 reports result from models that use the largest opposition vote total as a share of the total
vote. Initially, we find that Economic aid is associated with lower opposition vote shares, even when
dropping the most lopsided elections (column 3). However, this result is much weaker when we
include the full set of Lewbel instruments to the increase efficiency of the estimate (the F-statistic
increases from 5.7 in column 3 to 15.5 in column 5). The estimate for Economic aid in column 5 can
be interpreted to mean that a one-standard deviation increase in economic aid is associated with
a roughly 5 percent decrease in opposition vote share, which is statistically significant at the 0.17
level in a sample with only 70 observations. Using the full set of Lewbel instruments to increase
the efficiency of the estimate for Democracy aid (column 6) reduces the estimate for this type of
aid to almost zero.
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Table B-6: Lagged DV models for opposition vote
Opposition vote Share of 2-party vote Share of total vote
(1) (2) (3)a (4) (5) (6)a
Lag DV 0.458** 0.394** 0.209** 0.356* 0.343** 0.155
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Economic aid -0.012 0.222
(0.27) (0.41)
Democracy aid 0.563 0.194 0.476 0.206
(0.42) (0.27) (0.36) (0.31)
Log GDP pc -0.109 -0.002 -0.186* -0.101 0.051 -0.116
(0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Log population -0.112 -0.017 -0.113 0.003 0.022 -0.051
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Growth -0.034** -0.042** -0.021 -0.036** -0.045** -0.018
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
IMF program -0.045 -0.206 -0.115 -0.159 -0.118 -0.025
(0.41) (0.36) (0.29) (0.50) (0.35) (0.33)
(Intercept) 1.708 -0.609 1.954 0.061 -0.939 1.206
(1.50) (1.97) (1.28) (2.20) (1.75) (1.62)
F-statistic 15.0 28.2 22.1 8.4 32.3 25.3
Countries 30 30 26 30 30 26
Elections 50 50 44 50 50 44
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. IV models with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
a ≡ Incumbent vote share <90%.
Table B-6 reported results from lagged dependent variable models to account for the history of
voting in prior elections. The first three columns use the dependent variable reported in the
manuscript: the opposition share of the 2-party vote. The latter three columns use the same
depedent variable as in Table B-5: all opposition parties’ share of the total vote. We find little
evidence that aid influences either of these outcomes in the lagged DV models.
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Figure B-1: Distribution of estimates from IV probit models for Economic aid (Table 1, column 3)
and Democracy aid (Table 2, column 6) when excluding one country at a time from the sample.
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Appendix C: Identification strategy
Constructing the “outside” instruments
To construct the “outside” excluded instruments, we use a donor characteristic V ad,t, which is one
of two donor variables (Inflation or WiP, denoted by the superscript a), and which varies by donor
d and year t. For each recipient i and donor d in each year t, we multiply V ad,t by the inverted
geographic distance in kilometers (denoted by kd,i) between donor d and recipient i: Vd,t × kd,i.
Then we sum these to create the instrument, for each donor characteristic a ∈ (Inflation,WiP )
Zai,t =
∑
d
(V ad,t × kd,i)
For the binary dependent variable model (dropping the superscript a on Z), the resulting specifi-
cation in an “exactly” identified equation would be:
Pr(Yt = 1|Yt−1 = 0) = Âidi,t +Xi,t + ζi,t + 1i,t
Aidi,t = Zi,t +Xi,t + ζi,t + 
2
i,t
where Aidi,t and Zi,t are three-year lagged moving averages of aid and the instrument, Âidi,t is
the predicted value of aid from the first stage, Xi,t are control variables, and ζi,t are duration
polynomials.
Figure C-1 shows the partial correlation between different categories of aid and the two outside
excluded instruments (Inflation and WiP), in the full sample. From these partial correlation plots,
we can see that donor inflation is strongly and positively correlated with economic aid but weakly
and negatively correlated with democracy aid. We find just the opposite pattern for women in
parliament: WiP is strongly and positively correlated with democracy aid but negatively correlated
with economic aid. One possible explanation for these patterns could be that during times of
inflation, donors are likely to focus the aid portfolio on critical development sectors – at the expense
of democracy promotion – while more women in parliament might shift aid portfolios towards more
democracy-oriented sectors. Based on these partial correlations and expectations that each outside
instrument should be positively correlated with foreign aid, we employ Inflation as an excluded
instrument for economic aid and WiP as an excluded instrument for democracy aid.
Finally, we note that there are some potential outliers in the first stage partial correlation
between Inflation and Economic aid, as observed in the lower right corner of the upper left panel of
Figure C-1. These three observations come from South Africa prior to the multiparty transition in
1994 (South Africa received less Western foreign aid from fewer OECD donor countries). This helps
explains the low partial correlation between Inflation and Economic aid in the transition sample
used in Table 1 of the main text. Dropping South Africa and using Inflation in a just identified
equation (i.e. without the Lewbel instruments) yields a strong first-stage (partial) correlation
between Inflation and Economic aid (F-statistic= 17.8), with similar second stage results.
Identification with the Lewbel approach
The approach proposed by Lewbel (2012) identifies a two-equation model by using the presence of
heteroskedasticity (or a correlation between residuals and some exogenous covariates) in the “first-
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Figure C-1: Partial correlations for “outside” instruments and foreign aid.
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stage” linear regression. Identification exploits the fact that covariance between the “first-stage”
errors and the exogenous variables (X) is not necessarily zero but rather heteroskedastic. Consider
the following two-equation model for our application:
Y1 = β1X + γ1Aid+ 
1
Aid = β2X + γ2Z + 
2
The main outcome variable of interest (Y1) is a function of covariates (X) and (Aid), which is
endogenous (mismeasured). If Z is correlated with aid but unrelated to Y1, then Z may used as an
“outside” excluded instrument to generate predicted values of Aid. If, however, the cov(X, 22) 6=
0, the “first stage” residuals can be exploited as an “inside” excluded instrument. Because the
heteroskedasticity arises from the “first stage”, this does not threaten inferences from the estimate of
γ1. In practice, the construction of an “internal,” model-based excluded instrument is the following:
(1) calculated the residual from a “first-stage” regression (i,t); (2) calculate the in-sample deviation
from the mean for each independent variable in the first stage regression (Xi,t, − µX); and finally
(3) multiply the two: I = i,t × (Xi,t, − µX). Note that we can construct one “inside” instrument
from each of the independent variables in the first stage equation. Throughout the manuscript, we
refer to these “internal” excluded instruments as “Lewbel” instruments.
Since this approach requires the presence of heteroskedastic errors in the first-stage equation,
we examine the main model (for each type of aid) from each of the reported tests in the manuscript.
As Lewbel (2012) notes, it is easy to examine the scale-related heteroskedasticity with a Breusch-
Pagan type test in an OLS context, such as the first-stage equations in the present application.
Table C-1 reports these. The null in these tests is that the variance is constant (i.e. there is no
heteroskedasticity). Thus a large test statistic (χ2) indicates a rejection of the null, or the presence
of heteroskedasticity; and this means the Lewbel approach is likely to enhance the efficiency of
the IV estimator. When the test statistic is small, indicating little heteroskedasticity, including
“Lewbel” instruments is unlikely to improve model efficiency.
Table C-1: Heteroskedasticity in the first-stage regressions
Model Aid type χ2 p-value
Table 1, column 2 Economic 86.1 0.000
Table 1, column 5 Democracy 11.2 0.001
Table 2, column 2 Economic 0.4 0.528
Table 2, column 5 Democracy 8.8 0.003
Table 3, column 2 Economic 12.2 0.001
Table 3, column 5 Democracy 1.2 0.281
Table 4, column 2 Economic 0.06 0.804
Table 4, column 5 Democracy 0.56 0.455
The “inside” instruments are only likely to increase the efficiency of the IV estimator in four of
the eight main models where the test statistic is large. This same result can be seen by looking at
the F-statistic for all excluded instruments for each model and comparing it with the F-statistic for
Z (the outside instrument) only. For example, the complete instrument set in column 2 of Table
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1 has an F-statistic of 22.6, but the F-statistic for Inflation is only 9.5.1 This indicates that the
“inside” instruments substantially help the “explain” economic aid in that sample. This is another
way of showing the same information contained in the large χ2 statistic in the first row of Table
C-1. In contrast, the “inside” instruments do little to explain economic aid in the samples used in
Tables 2 and 4. Indeed the F-statistics for all excluded instruments in model 2 is not appreciably
larger than the F-statistic for Z only. In fact, for the model in Table 2 column 2, the F-statistic
for all excluded instruments is lower than the F-statistic for Z only, meaning that adding “inside”
instruments hurts efficiency in the IV estimator. Again, this information is also reflected in the
very low χ2 statistic in the third row of Table C-1.
To provide a consistent estimator across all models and specifications in the main text and
robustness checks, we include the “inside” (or “Lewbel”) instruments in all reported tests. However,
Table C-2 reports results from each of the main models where there is very little heteroskedasticity
present in the first stage errors (implying that the “Lewbel” instruments are not very useful). These
results parallel those reported in the main text, but the IV estimator is more efficient in the two
models, reflected in a larger F-statistic than when using the “Lewbel” instruments as well.
Table C-2: Results without Lewbel instruments
Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 4 Table 4 Table 5
Model column 2 column 5 column 2 column 3 column 5 column 6
Mulitparty Electoral
Dependent variable failure misconduct Opposition vote share
Economic aid -0.037 -1.657** -0.848
(0.04) (0.80) (0.79)
Democracy aid -0.303** 2.373** 0.963
(0.14) (1.02) (0.66)
Log GDP pc 0.012 -0.051 0.052 -0.153 0.133 -0.078
(0.01) (0.06) (0.25) (0.15) (0.31) (0.18)
Log population -0.007 0.005 -0.594* -0.426* 0.294 0.036
(0.02) (0.05) (0.31) (0.25) (0.20) (0.14)
Civil war -0.069
(0.06)
IMF program 0.047 0.617 0.492 -0.814 -0.230
(0.14) (0.50) (0.31) (0.61) (0.31)
First multiparty election 0.055
(0.12)
Monitor -0.067
(0.14)
Growth -0.040 -0.002 -0.058** -0.021
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
(Intercept) 1.054** 1.171 10.140* 7.362 -6.808 -1.362
(0.29) (0.74) (5.51) (4.52) (4.27) (2.98)
Observations 583 170 84 70 84 70
F-stat 56.4 36.2 8.4 5.7 7.4 3.6
∗ p<0.10; ∗∗ p<0.05. IV linear models with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration
polynomials not reported in column 1.
1This latter F-statistic reflects the partial correlation between Inflation and economic aid, con-
ditional on the covariates and the “inside” instruments.
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Exploring the exclusion restriction of the “outside” instruments
Overidentification tests
A method for exploring the strength of exclusion assumption is a test of overidentification (Baum,
Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). This approach assumes that the “inside” instruments are valid – in
the sense of meeting the exclusion restriction – and tests whether the “outside” instruments are
orthogonal to the error process in the outcome equation. For each model in the main text, we
report the C-statistic, which tests whether “outside” instrument is orthogonal to the errors in the
outcome equation, conditional on the “inside” instruments being valid. In all models, the p-value
of the C-statistic is greater than the conventional cut-point of 0.10, suggesting that Inflation and
WiP are valid excluded instruments.
Alternative channel of influence
While the C-statistic provides some information on the exclusion restriction for the “outside” in-
struments, it still assumes some valid excluded instruments to conduct the overidentification tests.
Theoretically, there may be alternative factors that are correlated with (even if not causally related
to) donor inflation and women in parliament. And these additional, unmodeled (perhaps unob-
served) factors may be causally related to the outcomes of interest. To explore this possibility, we
examine the partial correlation (i.e. conditional on covariates) between the outside instruments and
plausible alternative channels: trade; international and domestic non-governmental organizations;
the stock of recipient-country migrants in donor countries; alliances with donors; and the number
of international organizations to which the recipient government belongs.
We select these variables because they represent key areas of a country’s foreign policy which
could potentially be influenced by or correlated with female legislative representation or infla-
tion. These areas include trade, immigration, membership in international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and security. We do not have theoretical priors about the direction
through which an increase in the number of women in parliament might influence these foreign
policy areas. We thus focus our attention on the variables’ statistical association with our instru-
ments.
Measures and data sources
• Trade: The data for trade come from the IMF’s DOT database. We focus on trade, measured
as a logged sum of exports and imports from the aid-receiving country and donor countries in
the sample. It could be that female legislators are systematically more/less likely to push for
trade increase with democratizing countries than their male counterpart. This leads to the
conjecture that an increase in women in parliament affects democratic change in the recipient
country through the trade channel.
• Immigration: The data for immigration are from the OECD’s International Migration Databse.
We utilize a migrant stock measure, which captures the annual stock of people whose country
of origin is the aid-receiving African country and who currently reside in an OECD donor
country. It could be that female legislators are systematically more/less likely than their
male counterparts to lobby for increased immigration flows from countries where democratic
change occurs. This could imply that women in parliament affects democratic change in the
aid receiving country through the channel of immigration.
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• Membership in international organizations: We use IO membership data to capture “soft”
diplomacy. The data for IO membership come from Pevehouse 2006. We create a count of
international organizations to whom aid receipient countries belong as members. If women are
more/less likely to promote integration through international institutions, then democratic
change in the recipient country could be affected through the channel of diplomacy.
• Alliances: We use membership in security alliances to capture the security channel. The
data for alliance membership come from the Correlates of War Project. We create a count of
alliances that are shared between aid recipient countries and OECD countries in the donor
sample. If women are more/less likely than men to promote security relations through mili-
tary alliances then democratic change in the recipient country could be affected through the
security channel
• IGO and NGO Presence: We use the logged number of international and local non-governmental
organizations in aid-receiving countries as proxy for a donor governments’ level of partnership
with international and local NGOs. The data are drawn from the Yearbook of International
Organizations.
Table 3: Bivariate correlations
Alternative Women in
Channels Inflation Parliament
Trade -0.012 0.234
International NGOs -0.004 -0.225
Domestic NGOs 0.002 -0.203
Migrants 0.068 0.172
Alliance -0.010 0.004
IO membership -0.302 0.327
If the outside instruments are correlated with these factors, which might be causally related
to the outcome variable, then the exclusion assumption is weaker. The partial correlation plots
in Figure C-2 show that three of these variables are (partially) correlated with Inflation: trade;
migrant stock; and IO membership. For trade and IO membership the correlation with Inflation
is driven in large part by a handful of outliers: recipient countries with low trade and membership
relatively few IOs. None of the proxies for alternative channels, however, are (partially) correlated
with women in parliament. Thus there is little empirical connection between the WiP and these
alternative channels. In Appendix B, we report robustness tests in which the specification adds
each of these variables as a control. In each of these tests, the main reported result holds.
Treating the “outside” instruments as “plausibly” exogenous
In this section, we relax the exogeneity assumption to assess how doing so influences the estimate
of interest. In the spirit of treating the outside instruments as “plausibly exogenous”, we examine
whether inference from the reported tests wiil still be valid even if these variables (Z) are weakly
related to the outcome. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) introduce an approach that allows
researchers to assess how the estimate of interest in an outcome equation changes as an excluded
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Figure C-2: Partial correlation between outside instruments and alternative channels.
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instrument becomes more highly correlated with the errors in the outcome equation. Consider the
following equation, where Y is the outcome variable, X are (potentially endogenous) covariates and
Z is a (potentially) excluded instrument.
Y = βX + γZ + 
The exogeneity restriction amounts to assuming that γ = 0. Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)
examine several approaches to relaxing this assumption by allowing γ 6= 0 and assessing how do so
influences estimates of β.
In our application, we use the unified confidence interval approach, which makes no prior as-
sumption about the distribution of γ but only specifies the possible values for γ. As Conley, Hansen
and Rossi (2012) show, this is the most conservative approach insofar as making assumptions about
the distribution reduces the coverage area, thus narrowing the errors bands for the estimate of in-
terest.2 We adopt this approach because we do not have a theoretically informed prior belief about
the possible causal relationship between donor inflation (and female parliamentary representation)
and political change in African aid recipient countries.3 We do, however, have an estimate of γ from
the reduced-form equation, which we use as a “plausible” upper bound for γ. That is, if the outside
instruments are not completely exogenous, then the worst case scenario is that γ is approximately
as large as the reduced-form estimate of γ.
Figure C-3 shows how the estimates for Economic aid and Democracy aid change (for the
models reported in Table 1, column 2 and Table 2, column 5, respectively) as we vary γ from
zero (“exogenous”) up to the reduced form estimate of γ. The differing horizontal scales in each
panel of the figure reflect the fact that the estimates of the reduced-form coefficients differ for each
model. In the multiparty transition model, the reduced-form estimate of γInflation is 0.038, while
the reduced-form estimate of γWiP in the multiparty failure model is 0.0037. We might think of
these as plausible upper bounds for the extent to which the outside instrument is not exogenous
but simply “plausibly exogenous.”
When γInflation equals zero, the left panel depicts the estimate of Economic aid, assuming a
perfectly exogenous outside instrument. As γInflation increases, this assumption is less plausible.
The left panel shows that even if γInflation exceeds the reduced-form estimate, then the coverage
area for the estimate of Economic aid does not contain zero. The right panel of C-3 shows that
the exogeneity assumption must be stronger for WiP for the estimate of Democracy aid to remain
valid: the error band contains zero once γWiP reaches about 0.0006 – or about one-sixth of the size
of the reduced-form estimate.
We reiterate that these tests are not tests of instrument exogeneity, but rather simulations of
the estimate of interest if we assume that the exogeneity assumption is only “plausible” and not
“perfect.” These tests do not tell us whether we have a “weak” instrument but rather conservatively
assess how the causal estimates for foreign aid would change if the “outside” excluded instruments
2Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012, 260) note that “[i]nterval estimates for β, the treatment
parameter of interest, can be obtained conditional on any potential value of γ. Taking the union
of these interval estimates across different γ values provides a conservative (in terms of coverage)
interval estimate for β. A virtue of this method is that it requires only specification of a range
of plausible values for β without requiring complete specification of a prior distribution. Its chief
drawback is that the resulting interval estimates may be wide.”
3We set the priors on the “Lewbel” instruments to zero, thus assuming they are exogenous.
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Figure C-3: Coefficient estimates and 90 percent Unified Confidence Intervals. Estimates
for models reported in Table 1, column 2 (multiparty transition) and Table 2, column 5 (multiparty
failure).
are correlated with the errors in the outcome equation.
Finally, we find these tests informative when we consider them alongside the information in
Figure C-2, which shows that some plausible alternative channels are correlated with Inflation but
not with WiP. While the union of confidence intervals are not as robust for WiP, we believe that
this external instrument is more likely to be plausibly exogenous in the first place, as evidenced by
the partial correlation plots in the right panel of Figure C-2.
Exploring possible heterogeneous treatment effects
For the IV estimate to recover the average treatment effect of the treated, treatment assignment
cannot be heterogeneous. In other words, if the instrument set is only correlated with foreign aid
in part of the sample and not another, then the treatment – in this case, the excluded instrument
set – is not homogenous and the reported estimates in the outcome equation will not reflect the
average treatment effect.
One way to explore for hetereogenous treatment effects is to (randomly) divide the sample in
half and estimate the first-stage equation in each sub-sample to see if the partial correlation between
the instrument set and the endogenous (foreign aid) variable is present in each. If there is a strong
correlation in both sub-samples, then this provides some evidence consistent with the homogenous
treatment effect assumption.
For the samples in Tables 1 and 2 of the main text, we randomly split each into two (half)
sub-samples. Then we estimate the first stage equation and report the F-statistic for the joint
signficance of the excluded instrument set. The top panel of Table C-4 shows the F-stastics from
this exercise. For each model, the (random) split-samples each yield F-statistics greater than 10.0.
Next, we divide each sample by the median year; and again the F-statistics are large for each sub-
sample in each model. The only F-statistic that is less than 10 is the one for the earlier years in the
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multiparty transition sample. (Note that the earlier sub-sample contains lagged aid information
from the late 1980s.) Finally, when we split each sample geographically (roughly along northern
versus southern parts of sub-Saharan Africa), the sub-samples again yield large F-statistics. This
exercise suggests that, at least when we divide each of these samples in half, there is evidence of
strong treatment assignment in each.
Table C-4: F-statistics from split samples
Model Aid type F-stat 1 F-stat 2
Random sub-samples
Table 1, column 2 Economic 11.7 15.6
Table 2, column 5 Democracy 15.8 36.1
Divide by year
Table 1, column 2 Economic 30.1 9.1
Table 2, column 5 Democracy 12.9 148.9
Divide by country
Table 1, column 2 Economic 27.1 17.6
Table 2, column 5 Democracy 35.2 14.6
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